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ADAM CANDEUB
At the end of June, the Supreme Court
decided NEA v. Finley, in which it
upheld the constitutionality of requir-
ing the National Endowment for the
Arts to consider "general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American
public" in awarding grants. Four grant
applicants had brought suit. The dis-
trict court ruled in favor of applicants,
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling
that the requirement was unconstitu-
tional because it discriminated on the
basis of viewpoint and was impermis-
sibly vague. The Supreme Court
reversed.
Writing for the Court, Justice
O'Connor rejected the applicants'
argument that the statutory provision
at issue requires viewpoint discrimina-
tion. Rather, she found that the provi-
sion requires the NEA "merely to take
'decency and respect' into considera-
tion." Justice O'Connor reached this
conclusion by comparing the "decency
and respect" provision to another pro-
vision that prohibits the NEA from
funding obscenity. She stated that the
"decency and respect" provision,
which only requires the NEA to
"tak[e] into consideration" certain
standards, "stands in sharp contrast" to
the obscenity provision, which pro-
hibits certain classes of speech "in no
uncertain terms." She also relied upon
legislative history showing that the
disputed provision "was a bipartisan
... counterweight to amendments
aimed at eliminating the NEA's fund-
ing or substantia'ly constraining its
grant-making authority," and was not
meant to impose "viewpoint-based
standards for funding." Accordingly,
she construed the statutory provision
as merely "advisory."
Justice O'Connor also reasoned
that because the decency and respect
provision is "susceptible to multiple
interpretations," it does not "effective-
ly preclude or punish the expression of
particular views," and thus does not
"engender the kind of directed view-
point discrimination that would
prompt this Court to invalidate a
Adam Canthub is an attorne v at Jones,
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D.C
statute on its face." She contrasted the
provision with other legislation, ruled
unconstitutional by the Court, that
suppressed "distinctive" ideas and
messages and thus presented "more
evident and more substantial dangers"
of invidious viewpoint discrimination.
Interpreting the statutory provision
as advisory and open-ended, the Court
concluded that the provision is unlike-
ly to "introduce any greater element of
selectivity than the determination of
'artistic excellence' itself," which the
statute also requires.
Therefore, the Court
concluded, any First The (',ourt
Amendment concerns
would be too "hypo-
thetical" to justify
statute required that the decency and
respect factors "always be consid-
ered," and thus constituted viewpoint
discrimination. He further argued that
the legislative history, to the extent it
was relevant at all, confirmed that the
legislation sought to "disfavor," and
therefore discriminate against such
"offensive productions as Serrano's
'Piss Christ,' the portrayal of a cruci-
fix immersed in urine, and
Mapplethorpe's show of lurid homo-
erotic photographs."
4'4oJIluded tha i the S1tllte
is not tiI1'onslitIuioall vague.
decring the provision
unconstitutional. The
Court also reserved judgment on the
reasonableness of the NEA's interpre-
tation of the statute, under which "the
formulation of diverse advisory panels
is sufficient to comply with Congress'
command."
Finally, the Court concluded that
the statute is not unconstitutionally
vague. Although recognizing that the
First and Fifth Amendments protect
speakers "from arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement of vague stan-
dards," the Court concluded that when
"the Government is acting as patron
rather than as sovereign, the conse-
quences of imprecision are not consti-
tutionally severe." The Court added
that in the context of selective subsi-
dies, like the NEA grants, it is often
impossible to "legislate with clarity."
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, concurred in the judgment
but sharply criticized the majority's
opinion. Quoting the old saw "The
operation was a success, but the
patient died," Justice Scalia stated that
"[wihat such a procedure is to medi-
cine, the Court's opinion in this case
is to law." fie criticized the majority
opinion for finding the "decency and
respect" language merely advisory.
Rather, Justice Scalia argued that the
statutory provision required content-
and viewpoint-based discrimination,
but was nonetheless constitutional.
Justice Scalia concluded that the
Commenting that "[alvant-garde
artistes such as respondents remain
entirely free to pater les bourgeois;
they are merely deprived of the addi-
tional satisfaction of having the bour-
geoisie taxed to pay for it," Justice
Scalia argued that the statute was con-
stitutional even though it was discrim-
inatory. In his most fundamental dis-
agreement with the majority, he distin-
guished between "the denial of tax-
payer subsidy" and "measures aimed
at the suppression of dangerous ideas"
and argued that the First Amendment
simply does not apply to mere denials
of subsidies.
Justice Souter alone dissented. Like
Justices Scalia and Thomas, he dis-
agreed with the majority's "advisory"
reading of the statute and argued that
the statute did require viewpoint dis-
crimination. But, unlike Justices
Scalia and Thomas, he concluded that
the discrimination was unconstitution-
al. Justice Souter argued that
Rosenberger i. Rector anlid 1 isitors of
Universitv offirginia. 515 U.S. 819
(1995) applies. In Rosenherger, the
Court held that the University of
Virginia could not discriminate on the
basis of editorial viev point in under-
writing the speech of student-run pub-
lications. Similarly, Justice Souter
argued that the government could not
engage in viewpoint discrimination in
the awarding of grants.
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